A new Android spyware family named as BusyGasper which is distributed by unknown threat actors that contains unique spy implant with stand-out features such as device sensors listeners, motion detectors.
It communicating via FTP server to download the payload or updates using C&C server and further indication reveal that a Russian web hosting service Ucoz provided the FTP Server access.
In this case, further analysis reveals that Several TXT files with commands on the attacker’s FTP server contain a victim identifier.
Also, attackers main focus on Asus devices and an information gathered from the email account provides a lot of the victims’ personal data, including messages from IM applications
Based on this BusyGasper spyware analysis, it designed with lacking encryption, use of a public FTP server and the low opsec level indicates that fewer skills malware developer behind this attack.
BusyGasper Spyware Working Function
Attack Initially install the first module on the target victims device that controls over the IRC protocol and enables deployment of other components.
There is no evidence that attackers using any exploit to obtain root privileges, so researchers believe that attackers used some unseen component to obtain the further privileges.
The second module stealing the log file which will later upload into FTP server and sent to the attacker’s email inbox even possible to send log messages via SMS to the attacker’s number.
Later attack installing the keylogger and the listener can operate with only coordinates, so it calculates pressed characters by matching given values with hardcoded ones.
According to Kaspersky, There is a hidden menu (Activity) for controlling implant features that looks like it was created for manual operator control. To activate this menu the operator needs to call the hardcoded number “9909” from the infected device.
Finally attacker using ftp://213.174.157[.]151/ as a command and control server to share the stolen data.
Indicators of compromise – MD5